Greg Detre
@12.30 on Friday 20 October, 2000
with Ellene???, in Exeter College
�is� vs �how this is� � Nagel
e.g. matter �is� energy means nothing until you understand the how + theory of it
properties of mental states:
����� intentionality, aboutness
consciousness
folk psychology, intentions/desires/beliefs etc. used to explain behaviour
causal?
private
non-physical
behaviourism explains mental states in terms of behaviour alone
Lewis allows only for physical states, i.e. we�ve got a way of capturing mental states (in physical terms) in ignorance of what they actually are
water-is-H2O interfaces with a theory, it�s predictive
mind-is-a-physical-state does not have the same explanatory power, because it doesn�t have the same richness of generative theory behind it � relatively inadequate explanatory payoff
can you interface the 2 terminologies, e.g. loudness and amplitude of soundwave
does an interface between vocabularies require an intermediary terminology. no, it�s to do with levels + concepts
perhaps it means that it explains everything, i.e. there is no explanatory gap when everything is integrated with the rest of our knowledge
we want to give mental events a causal role in the world
as a (sub-)species of physical causal interaction
alternatively, as non-physical causal interaction somehow
Smart � ID theory = the simplest theory (and has been historically neglected), so if you can�t refute it, go for it by default (Ockham�s Razor)
ID theory lacks explanatory power for some of the properties of mentality, e.g. phenemonology (but you cannot demonstrate evidence of the existence of such a property)
what property of pain is phenomenology?
a conscious state
subjective
a way of feeling � unpleasant (in physicalist terms, �aversive�)
pain is a type
a contingent feeling???
even physicalism is dualist � objects + laws � no, matter + energy are one, supposedly
you�re either an epiphenomalist or you look to a new understanding of matter
next tutorial � Fridays @12
behaviourism + functionalism
General topics first
Then specific topics (e.g. private language, perception, action, machines + mentality, content)